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ABSTRACT
The right of publicity is currently a jumble of state common law
and state statutes, but the online fantasy sports industry crosses
state lines with ease. Having witnessed the great revenue potential
of online fantasy sports, professional sports leagues are trying to
strong-arm independent fantasy sports providers out of the
business by using the right of publicity to assert property interests
in the statistics generated by professional players, and used by
fantasy sports providers to run their online games. The first such
attempt—by Major League Baseball—failed. However, the state
law nature of the right of publicity prevents any single court
opinion from binding the industry or other jurisdictions. The
National Football League is attempting to achieve a more
favorable result in a different jurisdiction. If successful, other
professional sports leagues will be encouraged to litigate the issue,
and Major League Baseball might even attempt to re-litigate its
position in other states. This free-for-all could result in different
rules for different sports in different states, which would not only
be untenable for the online fantasy sports providers, but a violation
of the Constitution as well. A cohesive federal right of publicity
statute would (1) bring uniformity to the doctrine, (2) give federal
courts (where these actions are being brought) a federal law to
apply instead of allowing them to continue muddying the
application of state laws, (3) directly address First Amendment
concerns, and (4) solve the dormant commerce clause violation
alluded to above.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Fantasy sports as we know them today have their roots in Rotisserie
League Baseball, which was founded in 1980 by Daniel Okrent. 2 What
1
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began as a handful of friends meeting over burgers 3 has transformed into a
cultural juggernaut played by an estimated 19.4 million people in the United
States and Canada alone. 4 This phenomenal growth can be explained in
two words: the internet.5 Online fantasy sports providers have been able
both to grow their audience and to branch out far beyond the original
Rotisserie baseball, offering fantasy games in hockey, football, basketball
and other sports. 6
¶2
Participants in a fantasy sports game act as managers of their
“fantasy” (i.e. imaginary) teams. Each fantasy league holds a draft at the
beginning of the season whereby participants choose players for their team.
Unlike the professional leagues’ drafts, in which players from college or
high school are chosen, participants in a fantasy league choose from, and
are limited to, players currently employed by the professional leagues. As
the corresponding “real” season unfolds, the statistics of each professional
player are compiled to determine which player/manager in the fantasy
league is “winning.” The same achievements that make a real player in the
professional leagues a valuable asset also make him a desirable member of a
fantasy team. For example, a hockey player who scores a lot of goals, or a
baseball player with a high batting percentage, would be highly sought-after
both in the real-life professional league and in the various fantasy leagues.7
¶3
Because the fantasy leagues correspond with the professional
leagues, the information that makes the fantasy games possible is the factual
record of what takes place in live games: the statistics generated by each

Statistics, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 301, 304 (2006) (citing Chris Colston, Revisiting
Roto’s Roots, USA TODAY BASEBALL WEEKLY, Dec. 8, 1999,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/bbw/2001-04-04/2001-04-04-archiveroto.htm).
3
Colston, supra note 2.
4
Press Release, Fantasy Sports Trade Ass’n, Fantasy Sports Conference
Demographic Survey Shows Continued Growth (Aug. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.fsta.org/news/pressreleases/PRWebFantasySportsConference0807.pdf.
5
See Quiming, supra note 2, at 307 (“The rise of the Internet and digital
technology has revolutionized fantasy sports.”).
6
Complaint at ¶ 4, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).
7
One important difference is that in real life, an athlete can play for only one
team at a time. In the fantasy world, only one participant in a given league can
“own” that player, but the same player may be on hundreds of different fantasy
teams in different leagues. Also, fantasy participants can play in more than one
fantasy league at a time, even within the same sport. The make-up of each of
that participant’s fantasy teams will change, depending on which players he is
able to draft in each league’s game.
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individual player. 8 Online fantasy sports providers are battling against the
professional sports leagues and their players’ associations over whether the
fantasy providers should pay licensing fees to use the players’ names and
the statistics they generate. This question turns on whether the players have
an enforceable right of publicity interest in their names and playing
records. 9
¶4
Part I of this note briefly summarizes the history and development
of the right of publicity. Part II describes recent and current litigation
between fantasy providers and affiliates of Major League Baseball (MLB)
and the National Football League (NFL), respectively. Part III examines
the various federal legal theories that are often implicated in right of
publicity suits, including the fantasy sports lawsuits. Finally, Part IV uses
the fantasy sports cases to illustrate the ways in which a federal statute
could alleviate problems that arise from the disparate treatment states give
to the right of publicity. 10

8

See Adam L. Sheps, Note, Swinging for the Fences: The Fallacy in Assigning
Ownership to Sports Statistics and its Effect on Fantasy Sports, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 1113, 1114 (2006) (“‘The lifeblood of the competition is the actual
performance statistics of Major League Baseball players.’” (quoting Jack F.
Williams, Symposium, Who Owns the Back of a Baseball Card?: A Baseball
Player’s Rights in His Performance Statistics, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1705, 1708
(2002))).
9
See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (declaratory judgment action by a fantasy
sports provider against Major League Baseball); see also Complaint, CBS
Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D.
Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008) (declaratory judgment action by a fantasy sports
provider against National Football League).
10
Implicit in my argument is a concession that the right of publicity as a
doctrine is necessary at all. One commentator has pointed out that the
justification for the right is circular:
It is sometimes said that the right of publicity rests on the
commercial value of the interest itself, but that explanation is
nonsense without something more. A claim of this sort will have
commercial value only if it also has the protection of the law. In
a sense, the value of this property stems from the fact that the
law recognizes it and protects it.
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 160 (1981) (footnotes omitted). For a non-fantasy sports-related analysis of
the need for a federal right of publicity statute, see Eric J. Goodman, A National
Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAULLCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227 (1999).
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I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity originally derived from the right to privacy. 11
An 1890 law review article by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren is
generally credited with inventing the concept of the right to privacy, 12
which is often described as the “right ‘to be let alone.’”13 In typical fashion,
once the legal concept was introduced, the states began to adopt it either
through common law or by passing state statutes.14
¶5

¶6
In 1953 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
coined the term “right of publicity” to explain why famous people, such as
baseball players, “far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements.” 15 The following year
Melville Nimmer wrote his seminal law review article on the right of
publicity, explaining that “it may seriously be doubted that the application
of [the right to privacy] satisfactorily meets the needs of Broadway and
Hollywood in 1954.” 16 But as Nimmer also pointed out, “by the very nature
of our judicial process, a new principle of law can never be completely
embodied in any one decision.” 17 And so, the right of publicity continued
to evolve from Nimmer’s (and the Second Circuit’s) original articulation.
¶7
In a 1960 law review article, William Prosser divided the right to
privacy into four prongs, the violation of any one of which would be an
actionable tort. 18 The fourth prong essentially described the right of
publicity and was phrased as “[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s
11

See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
202, 203 (1954) (“The[] concern is rather with publicity, which may be regarded
as the reverse side of the coin of privacy.”)
12
Id. at 202 (“Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in their essay ‘The Right to
Privacy’ produced what is perhaps the most famous and certainly the most
influential law review article ever written.”).
13
Dana Howells, Note, Log Me in to the Old Ballgame: C.B.C. Distribution and
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 477, 478 (2007) (quoting Pasevich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
68, 71–72 (Ga. 1905)).
14
Nimmer, supra note 11, at 202.
15
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953); see also id. (“We think that, in addition to and independent of that right
of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege
of publishing his picture . . . .”).
16
Nimmer, supra note 11, at 202.
17
Id. at 221.
18
See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (“The law of
privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the
plaintiff . . . .).
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advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”19 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts 20 and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition21 each
includes something akin to the right of publicity. These Restatements have
been relied on by “states that have yet to codify” 22 the right of publicity and
have instead developed the right through case law. Today, “[t]he right of
publicity is properly viewed as a species within the genus of ‘unfair
competition’ law,” 23 and infringement of the right may properly be termed a
“misappropriation.” 24 A person’s right of publicity is considered to be a
form of intellectual property, 25 and, as will be illustrated in Part III infra,
other branches of intellectual property—specifically copyright and
trademark—are frequently implicated in right of publicity infringement
actions.
¶8
The right of publicity is exclusively the province of state law,
whether common or statutory. 26 Because there is no federal right of
publicity, when deciding right of publicity cases, federal courts are obliged
to apply state law. Because of the number of celebrities residing in
California, its state and federal courts have contributed considerably to right
of publicity law. 27 Several of the most often-cited right of publicity cases—
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 29 and White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. 30 —were decided by the United States

19

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) (“One who appropriates to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy.”).
21
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§
48 and 49.”).
22
Goodman, supra note 10, at 235.
23
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:7 (2d ed.
2000).
24
Id. § 1:8 (“In fact, some have claimed that misappropriation is the legal theory
that is the closest neighbor to the modern right of publicity.”).
25
Id. § 1:3 (“The right of publicity is a state-law created intellectual property
right whose infringement is a commercial tort of unfair competition.”).
26
JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 21 (1996).
27
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“For
better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit.”).
28
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
29
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
30
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
20
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was (ostensibly) applying
California state law.31
¶9
The White case produced two separate Ninth Circuit opinions, each
with its own dissenting opinion, and involved a Samsung advertisement that
depicted a robot posed on the Wheel of Fortune set and dressed to resemble
Vanna White, the hostess of that game show. 32 White sued Samsung for
appropriating her identity, among other claims. 33 In the first White
decision, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to Samsung because, even though Samsung had not
used “White’s ‘likeness’ within the meaning of [the California statute],” 34
White had “alleged facts showing that Samsung . . . appropriated her
identity.” 35 Judge Alarcon dissented in part, observing, “the courts of
California have never found an infringement on the right to publicity
without the use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”36
¶10
The second White opinion was a denial of the petition for a
rehearing en banc, 37 which produced a blistering dissent authored by Judge
Kozinski and joined by two other Circuit Judges.38 Judge Kozinski warned
that by allowing this extension of the right of publicity, the court was on
“dangerous” ground and was jeopardizing creativity by depleting the public
domain. 39 He also referred to the panel’s decision as “a classic case of
overprotection.” 40

31

Bette Midler and Tom Waits sued Ford Motor Company and Frito-Lay,
respectively, for using “sound-alike” singers in advertisements that led the
consuming public to believe that Midler and Waits were actually performing the
songs in the ads. In Midler, a Ninth Circuit panel held “that when a distinctive
voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in
order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have
committed a tort in California.” Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. In Waits, a different
Ninth Circuit panel declined to reconsider or overrule Midler’s precedent. See
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100 (“[W]e are not at liberty to reconsider this conclusion,
and even if we were, we would decline to disturb it.”).
32
White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
33
Id. at 1397.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1399.
36
Id. at 1403 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the
California legislature previously had the opportunity to amend the state right of
publicity statute to protect something other than name, likeness, voice, and
signature, and had not done so. Id.
37
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
38
Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
39
Id. at 1513.
40
Id. at 1514. Judge Kozinski continues: “This Orwellian notion withdraws far
more from the public domain than prudence and common sense allow. It
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¶11
While the Ninth Circuit has expanded the reach of the right of
publicity, other courts have limited it. Several courts have addressed the
inherent First Amendment issue in allowing a person to have total control
over how his or her name and likeness are used, thereby restricting the free
expression of others wishing to use that name or likeness. 41 Although the
First Amendment’s prohibition against restraining speech applies only to
government, courts have allowed First Amendment suits between two
private entities if a state statute or common law is involved.42 In Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, a company selling trading
cards depicting parodic caricatures of well-known MLB players sued the
players’ association for a declaration that its cards did not violate the
players’ rights of publicity. 43 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit considered whether the lack of overt state action was a bar to
Cardtoons’ use of the First Amendment as a defense and decided that
“[a]lthough this is a civil action between private parties, it involves
application of a state statute that Cardtoons claims imposes restrictions on
its right of free expression. Application of that statute thus satisfies the state
action requirement of Cardtoons’ First Amendment claim.” 44
¶12
Later courts seem to have accepted the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in
allowing the First Amendment to be used as a defense to right of publicity
actions, and do not independently analyze such claims. In Gionfriddo v.
Major League Baseball, the plaintiff, who was a retired MLB player, sued
MLB to prevent it from using his name and likeness in a media guide to be
distributed “at All-Star and World Series games.” 45 Taking for granted that
a First Amendment analysis was appropriate, the California Court of Appeal
proceeded with a discussion of why and how the First Amendment
protected MLB. 46 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit did not explicitly state why it was applying a First

conflicts with the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause. It raises serious
First Amendment problems. It’s bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second
look.” Id.
41
E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1989); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307
(Ct. App. 2001).
42
The First Amendment applies explicitly to Congress; it applies implicitly to
the states through the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.
43
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962
(10th Cir. 1996).
44
Id. at 968.
45
Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310.
46
Id. at 313 (“The First Amendment requires that the right to be protected from
unauthorized publicity ‘be balanced against the public interest in the
dissemination of news and information . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
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Amendment defense when Tiger Woods unsuccessfully sued an artist for
violating his right of publicity by painting a work depicting Woods and
several other famous golfers. 47
¶13
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit upheld a First Amendment defense, in C.B.C. Distribution &
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., again
without explicitly explaining why it was applicable in the first place.48 This
decision prompted a wave of law review articles debating whether the
district court and the Eighth Circuit correctly allowed C.B.C.’s First
Amendment rights to trump the MLB players’ rights of publicity. 49

II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND FANTASY SPORTS
Right of publicity issues are not new to sports—indeed, the 1953
Second Circuit decision that introduced the term “right of publicity”
involved two rival baseball card companies.50 But C.B.C. was the first
reported opinion 51 to address the right of publicity vis-à-vis fantasy sports.52
The case was decided in 2006 by a federal court in Missouri in favor of
C.B.C., the fantasy sports provider 53 and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit in
¶14

47

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Rush’s
prints are not commercial speech. They do not propose a commercial
transaction. Accordingly, they are entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment.”).
48
C.B.C. Dist. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Adv. Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold that CBC’s first amendment rights in
offering its fantasy baseball products supersede the players’ rights of publicity
. . . .”).
49
E.g., Gabriel Grossman, Comment, Switch Hitting: How C.B.C. v. MLB
Advanced Media Redefined the Right of Publicity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285
(2007); Timothy W. Havlir, Note, Is Fantasy Baseball Free Speech? Refining
the Balance Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment, 4 DEPAUL
J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 229 (2008); David G. Roberts, Jr., Note, The
Right of Publicity and Fantasy Sports: Why the C.B.C. Distribution Court Got It
Wrong, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223 (2007).
50
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
51
See Havlir, supra note 49, at 245 (“The recent CBC case was the first court
ruling on this issue.”).
52
There is an earlier case that touched on fantasy sports and the right of
publicity, but it revolved around a contract issue. The fantasy sports provider in
that case had signed contracts with NFL players in order for them to appear on,
and endorse, the website. This violated the agreement the players had signed
with their players’ union, assigning group licensing rights to the union. See
Gridiron.com, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, Player’s Ass’n, Inc., 106 F. Supp.
2d 1309 (S.D. Fl. 2000).
53
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
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late 2007. 54 This case was likely the opening salvo in a war on the
professional leagues and their players’ associations.
¶15
The second volley was fired in September 2008, when CBS
Interactive, another online fantasy sports provider, filed suit against the
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) in federal court in
Minnesota, 55 which is also in the Eighth Circuit. National Football League
Players, Inc. (NFL Players) promptly filed a countersuit claiming that CBS
filed its suit in the wrong venue and against the wrong party. 56 A brief
summary of each case will highlight the issues raised.

A. C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P.
¶16
The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) is the
collective bargaining unit that includes all MLB players.57 Players assign
their rights to conduct group licensing (any licensing agreement involving
three or more players at a time) to the MLBPA. 58 From 1995 until
December 31, 2004, C.B.C. used MLB statistics, along with the names of
the players, in its fantasy games under the terms of two license
agreements. 59
¶17
In 2005 the MLBPA entered into an interactive media contract with
MLB Advanced Media, 60 which had been formed by MLB owners in 2000
“to serve as the interactive media and internet arm of Major League
Baseball.” 61 MLB Advanced Media notified C.B.C. that it was only willing
to grant C.B.C. a license to promote Advanced Media’s fantasy baseball
game, “in exchange for a percentage share of all related revenue.” 62
Advanced Media would not grant C.B.C. a license to allow C.B.C. “to
promote its own MLB fantasy game.” 63 C.B.C. filed a declaratory

54

C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
55
Complaint, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No.
08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).
56
Complaint, Nat’l Football League Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No.
08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008).
57
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n 2007–2011 Basic Agreement, art. II,
available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf.
58
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n: Licensing,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/licensing.jsp (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
59
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
60
Id. at 1081.
61
Id. at 1080.
62
Id. at 1081.
63
Id.
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judgment action seeking an injunction to prevent Advanced Media “from
interfering with CBC’s business related to sports fantasy teams.” 64
The original complaint was filed in federal court because it included
claims under statutory federal trademark law (the Lanham Act)65 in addition
to a state right of publicity claim. 66 The parties eventually agreed to dismiss
all the federal claims, leaving only the state right of publicity claim to be
adjudicated. 67 After deciding that it would exercise supplemental
jurisdiction,68 the district court held that (1) C.B.C.’s use did not constitute
“the persona or identity of any player” under Missouri common law, 69 and
(2) even if it had, “CBC’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression
prevails over the players’ claimed right of publicity.”70 The court granted
C.B.C.’s motion for summary judgment and entered an injunction to
prevent Advanced Media from “interfer[ing] with CBC’s using players’
names and playing records on its website and in its fantasy baseball
games.” 71
¶18

¶19
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court on the first
issue, stating that “it is clear that CBC uses baseball players’ identities in its
fantasy baseball products” and that the players had “offered sufficient
evidence to make out a cause of action for violation of their rights of
publicity under Missouri law.” 72 But the Eighth Circuit agreed that
C.B.C.’s rights under the First Amendment “supersede the players’ rights of
publicity” 73 and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. 74 Advanced
Media petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, but the
Court declined to hear the case.75 C.B.C.’s victory was hailed as “a

64

Id. at 1082.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006).
66
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”).
67
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 n.5 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
68
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2006) (stating a district court has the discretion to
hear or decline to hear any claims remaining after the dismissal of “all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction”).
69
C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
70
Id. at 1099.
71
Id. at 1107.
72
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007).
73
Id. at 824.
74
Id. at 825.
75
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. v. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg.,
Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2872 (mem.) (2008) denying cert. to 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
2007).
65
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landmark win for the fantasy sports industry” in a press release issued by
the Fantasy Sports Trade Association.76 Within a year of C.B.C.’s victory
over MLB, professional football was faced with its own fantasy sports
lawsuit.

B. CBS Interactive Inc. v. National Football League Players
Association
CBS Interactive (CBS), another online fantasy sports provider, filed
a declaratory judgment action against the NFLPA in Minnesota federal
court on September 3, 2008. 77 CBS concluded that Minnesota was an
appropriate venue because CBS had customers within that state and the
NFL had a team, and therefore players (who are members of the NFLPA),
within that state. 78 According to the complaint, “CBS Interactive had
formerly entered into multiple licensing agreements with the Players
Association, through its licensing entity, National Football League Player
[sic] Incorporated.” 79 After the expiration of the most recent licensing
agreement, “[t]he Players Association demanded licensing fees for
continued use of names and statistics related to professional football
players.” 80
¶20

¶21
Encouraged by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in C.B.C., CBS took
the position that it did not need to pay licensing fees to continue using the
players’ names and statistics and filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking a number of declarations: (1) that its use of player statistics does
“not infringe any right of publicity allegedly owned or controlled by the
Players Association,” 81 (2) that if CBS is violating the players’ rights of
publicity, “the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution supersedes the
right of publicity,” 82 (3) that if CBS is violating the players’ rights, “federal
Copyright Law, which dedicates information used in a fantasy sports games
business to the public, preempts the right of publicity,” 83 and (4) that “[t]he
Players Association seeks to monopolize . . . the market for creation and

76

Press Release, Fantasy Sports Trade Ass’n, CDM Legal Victory in Appeals
Court Ensures Continued Fantasy Sports Growth (Oct. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.fsta.org/news/pressreleases/CBCvsMLBAM.doc.
77
Complaint, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No.
08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).
78
Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.
79
Id. ¶ 10.
80
Id. ¶ 11.
81
Id. ¶ 25.
82
Id. ¶ 19.
83
Complaint ¶ 22, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).
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maintenance of fantasy football games and the provision of related
information services” 84 in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. 85
¶22
Six days after CBS filed suit, NFL Players filed a countersuit in a
federal district court in Florida.86 NFL Players’ complaint alleged that it,
not the NFLPA, is the sole entity responsible for group licensing of NFL
players’ identities. 87 The complaint further alleged that CBS’s choice of
Minnesota for its suit was simply an attempt “to seek an advisory opinion
from a favorable forum, even though that forum has no jurisdiction over the
dispute.” 88 Lastly, NFL Players alleged that the Southern District of Florida
was the appropriate venue because the business unit of CBS Interactive that
operates the fantasy football website, CBSSports.com, is headquartered in
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. 89
¶23
NFL Players’ complaint sought the dismissal or transfer of the
allegedly improperly-filed CBS action, 90 as well as (1) a declaration that
CBS is violating the rights of publicity of players in the NFL,91 (2) an
injunction preventing CBS’s further use of NFL Players’ “Property Rights”
without permission, 92 and (3) a declaration that NFL Players is not violating
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. 93
¶24
On September 30, 2008, CBS filed an amended complaint in
Minnesota district court to include NFL Players as a defendant in addition
to the NFLPA. 94 In its amended complaint, CBS reiterated that the Federal
District of Minnesota was an appropriate venue for their suit.95 On the
same day, NFL Players filed a motion to transfer venue from Minnesota to

84

Id. ¶ 30.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (making it a felony to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States”).
86
Complaint, Nat’l Football League Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No.
08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008).
87
Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 14 (considering group licensing to be “a total of six (6) or more
NFL player images on or in conjunction with products”).
88
Id. ¶ 32. The same could be said for NFL Players in trying to move the
dispute to the Southern District of Florida, the jurisdiction that had enjoined
gridiron.com in a previous fantasy sports/right of publicity suit, albeit one
involving a contract dispute. See supra note 52.
89
Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.
90
Id. ¶ 34.
91
Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ 1.
92
Complaint at Prayer for Relief ¶ 3, Nat’l Football League Players Inc. v. CBS
Interactive, Inc., No. 08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008).
93
Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ 4.
94
First Amended Complaint, CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League
Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).
95
Id. ¶¶ 3–10.
85
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Florida. 96 On October 28, 2008, the Florida district court stayed the Florida
proceeding, “pending resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue in the
District of Minnesota action.” 97 On January 28, 2009, the Minnesota district
court judge held a hearing on the motion to transfer, along with several
other motions filed by the two parties, and issued an order on April 28,
2009. 98
¶25
The Minnesota court’s order addressed not only the preliminary
issue of proper venue, but also the substantive claims. The court first held
that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over NFL Players because of the
extent of its contacts within the state.99 Next, the court denied NFL Players’
motion to transfer venue after conducting a thorough analysis of the various
factors. 100 As to the substantive claims, the district court followed C.B.C.
and granted summary judgment to CBS Interactive on the claim that its
First Amendment rights trumped the players’ rights of publicity. 101 NFL
Players succeeded on only one issue – CBS Interactive’s antitrust claims.
The court ruled that NFL Players’ actions (i.e., threatening litigation and
filing the Florida action) were protected as “‘objectively reasonable efforts’
to protect Players Inc.’s interest in the publicity rights” and were thus
protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine from antitrust liability. 102

According to the docket report for the case filed and stayed in the
Southern District of Florida, NFL Players intends to file an appeal with the
Eighth Circuit. 103 Pending the outcome of that appeal, the case will either
¶26

96

Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), CBS Interactive
Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed
Sept. 3, 2008).
97
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or
Stay at 3, Nat’l Football Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No. 08-22504CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008).
98
Memorandum Opinion and Order, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football
League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).
99
Id. at 7–14.
100
Id. at 15–23.
101
Id. at 39–40.
102
Id. at 24.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is premised on the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances is derived from two antitrust cases decided by the
Supreme Court. Under the doctrine, the act of filing a lawsuit is
viewed as a form of petitioning activity and is therefore immune
from antitrust or tort liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
103
Paperless Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Football
Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No. 08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9,
2008).
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be re-litigated in Florida (if the Eighth Circuit reverses the Minnesota
district court on the question of proper venue), or the Florida action will be
dismissed. Although it remains to be seen how this case will be resolved,
one thing seems certain – federal courts will be the forum of choice for
litigating fantasy sports-related state law right of publicity issues.

III. FEDERAL LAWS IMPLICATED IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY SUITS
¶27
Despite the fact that right of publicity law is exclusively state law,
suits claiming violations of rights of publicity are often brought in federal
court. 104 Sometimes federal jurisdiction is obtained simply because the
parties have diversity of citizenship.105 In many cases, the plaintiff claims
violations of a federal law, 106 often § 43 of the Lanham Act,107 in order to
be properly within federal jurisdiction.108 The First Amendment 109 and
preemption by the federal Copyright Act 110 are often asserted as affirmative
defenses to claimed violations of the right of publicity. 111

A. The Trademark Act of 1946 (The Lanham Act)
Federal trademark law is governed by the Trademark Act of 1946
(the Lanham Act). 112 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides that “any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by” the use
¶28

104

E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003);
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.
1996); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1982); Complaint, CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc.
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D.
Mo. 2006).
105
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006) (providing that federal district courts have
jurisdiction over civil actions between “Citizens of different States” as long as
the amount “in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000”).
106
E.g., ETW, 332 F.3d 915; Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959; Groucho Marx, 689 F.2d
317.
107
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
108
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (providing that federal district courts have
jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States”).
109
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1101 (2006).
111
However, the fact that these federal laws are asserted as defenses does not
bring a claim properly within federal jurisdiction because of “the ‘well-pleaded
complaint’ rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
112
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006).
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of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . which—(A) is likely to
cause confusion . . . or (B) . . . misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
quality, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or commercial
activities” has a civil cause of action.113
For example, Vanna White raised a § 43(a) claim in her suit against
Samsung concerning Samsung’s use of a robot that resembled her in one of
its print advertisements. 114 The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Samsung, pointed out that
the standard for a § 43(a) claim is “a likelihood of confusion . . . over
whether White was endorsing Samsung’s VCRs” 115 and that such a
determination “is a matter for the jury”116 (i.e., not proper for summary
judgment).
¶29

¶30
C.B.C.’s original complaint sought a declaration that it was not
violating § 43(a) of the Lanham Act by using MLB players’ names and
statistics in its fantasy games. 117 Advanced Media’s answer and countersuit
alleged that C.B.C. was indeed violating the Lanham Act,118 but the parties
dismissed these claims prior to the district court’s consideration of the
issues. 119 If the Lanham Act claims had not been dismissed, it is quite
possible that the district court would have found that C.B.C. was not
violating the Lanham Act because it was not representing that MLB or any
of the individual players had endorsed its fantasy game, and C.B.C. quite
possibly could have shown (probably through survey evidence) that it was
not likely that anyone participating in C.B.C.’s fantasy games would be
confused as to whether MLB or its players had endorsed C.B.C.’s game.
Regardless, simply raising the issue had the effect of placing C.B.C. in
federal court, because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any
action arising under federal trademark law. 120

113

Id. § 1125.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992).
115
Id. at 1399–1400.
116
Id. at 1401.
117
Complaint ¶ 22, C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 05-00252CIV).
118
Answer & Counterclaim at 6, ¶ 7, C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006)
(No.05-00252-CIV).
119
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 n.5 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
120
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
114
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B. The First Amendment Defense
As described in Part I, supra, the First Amendment explicitly
prevents the federal government from interfering with a person’s freedom of
expression, but courts have held that enforcement of a state right of
publicity statute qualifies as state action for purposes of raising a First
Amendment defense. 121 In Cardtoons, trading cards depicting parodic
caricatures of well-known baseball players were found to “infringe upon
MLBPA’s publicity right as defined in [the Oklahoma statute],” 122 but the
fact that “[t]he cards provide social commentary on public figures” 123 was
found to be deserving of “full protection under the First Amendment.” 124
¶31

In C.B.C., even though the Eighth Circuit found that C.B.C. was
violating the baseball players’ rights of publicity, it affirmed the district
court’s holding that the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment superseded those rights.125 The district court had itself
conducted a thorough First Amendment analysis, first finding that the
fantasy sports games qualified for First Amendment protection despite the
fact that (1) fantasy sports games are “non-traditional expression,” 126 (2)
C.B.C. was “deriving a profit from its use of the names and playing
records,” 127 and (3) “interaction among . . . and between game
participants” 128 was present. The court then found that the fantasy games
were the sort of commercial speech protected by the First Amendment
because “CBC does not use players’ names and playing records for the
purpose of advertising a product or services.” 129 Finally, the court balanced
C.B.C.’s First Amendment rights against the players’ publicity rights and
concluded that “none of the justifications for the right of publicity compel a
finding that the First Amendment should not trump the right of
publicity.” 130
¶32

121

Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968
(10th Cir. 1996).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 969.
124
Id.
125
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
126
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
127
Id. at 1093.
128
Id. at 1094.
129
Id. at 1095.
130
Id. at 1099.
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C. Preemption By the Copyright Act of 1976
¶33
The U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 131 Pursuant to the “Supremacy Clause,” 132 federal law, as a
matter of course, trumps state law, and the Copyright Act of 1976 includes
specific language that any state law purporting to protect the same rights
protected by the Copyright Act is preempted by the Copyright Act. 133
¶34
Copyright exists “in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.” 134 In Feist Publications v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 135 the Supreme Court reiterated the “wellestablished proposition[] . . . that facts are not copyrightable”136 and held
that compilations of facts are only copyrightable if they have “at least some
minimal degree of creativity” 137 as required by the word “original” in the
Copyright Act.

In its lawsuit against MLB Advanced Media, C.B.C. asserted that
federal copyright law preempted the players’ state rights of publicity. The
district court found that the names and playing records of the players were
“factual information which is otherwise available in the public domain,”138
and held that “the players’ names and playing records as used by CBC in its
fantasy games are not copyrightable . . . [thus] copyright preemption does
not apply.” 139 The Eighth Circuit decided it did not need to “reach CBC’s
alternative argument that federal copyright law preempts the players’ state
law rights of publicity” because it had already decided that the First
Amendment offered a sufficient defense to the infringement of the players’
rights of publicity. 140
¶35

131

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land”).
133
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights [herein] . . . are governed exclusively by this
title.”).
134
Id. § 102(a).
135
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
136
Id. at 344.
137
Id. at 345.
138
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
139
Id. at 1103.
140
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
132
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¶36
CBS also included a federal copyright preemption claim in its
complaint against the NFLPA. 141 Because the district court granted
summary judgment to CBS Interactive on its First Amendment claims, it
ruled that the copyright preemption claim was rendered moot and declined
to address the question. 142 It will be interesting to see if fantasy sports
providers continue to raise copyright preemption as a defense in future
lawsuits and whether any court decides to reach the issue. 143

IV. TOWARD THE CREATION OF A FEDERAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
STATUTE
¶37
We live in an increasingly interconnected society. American
citizens no longer live several days’ journey away from their neighbors in
the next state, as they did when our Constitution was drafted. And fantasy
sports participants “‘no longer ha[ve] to seek out like-minded fans’” 144 as
they did in the Rotisserie League days; all they have to do is log on to their
computer to instantly connect with millions of fellow fans. In 1953, when
the right of publicity began its development, individual state laws probably
made sense. But to paraphrase Melville Nimmer, it may seriously be
doubted that this state law concept satisfactorily meets the needs of the
Internet Age in the 21st century. 145

A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Problem
Fantasy sports providers are nationwide enterprises. Dormant
commerce clause concerns arise whenever multiple state laws apply to a
business that crosses state lines. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the
power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”146 By
negative implication, the states are not permitted to pass laws that pose a
burden on interstate commerce.147 Judge Kozinski raised a similar concern
¶38

141

Complaint ¶ 22, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
No. 08-05097-CIV (E.D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).
142
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 43 n.19, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3,
2008).
143
For an interesting discussion of the conflicts between right of publicity
doctrine and copyright preemption, see generally Jennifer E. Rothman,
Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199
(2002).
144
Quiming, supra note 2, at 307 (quoting Greg Johnson, Suing Over Statistics,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at D1).
145
See Nimmer, supra note 11, at 203.
146
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
147
See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (“[W]e have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an
implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal
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in his dissent railing against the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of California’s
common law right of publicity in White v. Samsung.148 Judge Kozinski
pointed out that
the right of publicity isn’t geographically limited. A right of publicity
created by one state applies to conduct everywhere, so long as it
involves a celebrity domiciled in that state. . . . The broader and more
ill-defined one state’s right of publicity, the more it interferes with the
legitimate interests of other states. 149
¶39
If the MLBPA were to bring suit in a California federal court
against an internet fantasy sports provider for violating the players’ rights of
publicity, the MLBPA may very well prevail under the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of California law, which gives less weight to the First
Amendment defense. 150 This could put the internet fantasy sports provider
in the position of being required to pay a licensing fee for uses in California
of names and statistics of players who are domiciled in California, but not
for any uses in Missouri (under the C.B.C. decision). It would be very
difficult—if not impossible—for a fantasy sports provider to calculate
which fantasy sports participants in which states were using the statistics of
all the California-domiciled professional athletes. The other option, which
is equally unviable, would be to eliminate the California-domiciled
professional athletes from the fantasy sports games. Faced with a choice
between two impractical options, the providers would likely abide by the
more stringent state law and pay the MLBPA its requested fee to cover the
use of all players in the league. Thus, California law would be affecting
interstate commerce at the expense of Missouri law, a result specifically
prohibited by the dormant commerce clause.

statute.”). If a fantasy sports provider were to challenge a state right of publicity
law on constitutional grounds as a violation of the dormant commerce clause, it
likely would be evaluated using the Pike balancing test. See Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that when a state statute’s “effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits”).
148
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“Under
the dormant Copyright Clause, state intellectual property laws can stand only so
long as they don’t ‘prejudice the interests of other States.’” (quoting Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973))).
149
Id. at 1518–19.
150
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1407–08 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority gives
Samsung’s First Amendment defense short shrift . . . we must prevent the
creation of a monopoly that would inhibit the creative expressions of others.”).
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¶40
Although the scenario illustrated above is largely hypothetical at
this point, if NFL Players ultimately triumphs in its countersuit against CBS
(which could happen if the Eighth Circuit reverses the district court on the
venue question and the case is transferred to Florida), the litigation free-forall envisioned at the outset of this note is not all that far-fetched. A federal
right of publicity statute would alleviate the potential dormant commerce
clause problem by preempting any conflicting state right of publicity laws
that affect interstate commerce (as they do in the fantasy sports context) and
could be justified under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.151

B. The Messy Application of Current Right of Publicity Laws
¶41
Application of the current system of state right of publicity laws
varies widely from state to state and has been referred to as a
“patchwork” 152 and “schizophrenic” 153 by various commentators. Eric
Goodman notes that “[t]hese separate and independent efforts to define the
scope and protection of the right of publicity have resulted in confusion
among those faced with assessing the potential impact of a nationwide
advertising campaign.”154

With technology making our world smaller, it becomes increasingly
easier to run a nationwide enterprise, but burdensome to keep abreast of—
and comply with—the multitude of state right of publicity laws. A federal
right of publicity statute would bring uniformity to this doctrine and would
presumably be easier for federal courts to apply than the current variety of
state laws appears to be.
¶42

¶43
Judge Alarcon’s partial dissent in White revolved around his
concern that the Ninth Circuit, a federal court, was expanding California’s
state law in a way that no California state court had previously done.155 In
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., the Second Circuit
had to reverse the New York district court’s ruling because the lower court
had mistakenly applied New York right of publicity law instead of
151

Similarly, Congress used its Commerce Clause power to pass the first federal
statute governing trademarks, which had previously been governed exclusively
by state common law. DAVID LANGE ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES &
MATERIALS 45 (3d ed. 2007).
152
Goodman, supra note 10, at 245.
153
Jennifer Y. Choi, Comment, No Room For Cheers: Schizophrenic
Application in the Realm of Right of Publicity Protection, 9 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 121, 151 (2002).
154
Goodman, supra note 10, at 245.
155
White, 971 F.2d at 1402 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The majority asserts that the use of a likeness is not required under
California common law. . . . I cannot find any holding of a California court that
supports this conclusion.”).
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California law. 156 New York’s law allowed the right of publicity to descend
to a person’s heirs, whereas California’s did not. 157 A federal right of
publicity law would avoid both the problem of federal courts expanding
state law and the problem of federal courts applying the wrong state’s laws.

C. The Possibility of a Fair Use Exception
Fair use exceptions are built in to both the Copyright Act of 1976158
and the Lanham Act. 159 If Congress were to pass a federal right of publicity
statute, a similar fair use exception could be included.
¶44

¶45
The legislative history of section 107 of the Copyright Act shows
that its purpose was to codify the long-standing, judicially-created doctrine
of excusing copyright infringement when the use of the copyrighted
material is “fair” as determined on a case-by-case basis. 160 Section 107
includes four factors that must be considered by a court when determining
whether or not a use is fair:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 161

The second and third factors may not translate well to a right of publicity
context, but the first and fourth factors are certainly appropriate and could
be very useful in drafting a right of publicity fair use exception.162
¶46
The most obvious problem with importing a copyright-style fair use
exception into a federal right of publicity is the notorious difficulty of

156

Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir.
1982).
157
Id.
158
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
159
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
160
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (“The judicial doctrine of fair use,
one of the most important and well-established limitations on the exclusive right
of copyright owners, would be given express statutory recognition for the first
time in section 107. . . . [E]ach case raising the question must be decided on its
own facts.”).
161
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
162
For a more thorough discussion of this concept see Andrew Koo, The Right
of Publicity Fair Use Doctrine – Adopting a Better Standard, 4 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 21–24 (2006).
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applying fair use. 163 A different possibility would be the nominative fair
use concept from trademark law. Section 33 of the Lanham Act outlines
potential defenses to trademark infringement. 164 “[T]he use of a name . . .
otherwise than as a mark . . . in good faith only to describe the goods or
services of such party” is a defense to trademark infringement. 165 This
traditionally is taken to mean that a defendant may fairly use “the plaintiff’s
mark to describe the defendant’s own product.” 166 The Ninth Circuit has
applied this to situations in which the defendant used the plaintiff’s mark to
refer to the plaintiff’s product, as long as three conditions are met:
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without the use of the trademark; second, only so much of
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify
the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would,
in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by
the trademark holder. 167
¶47
Although players do not hold trademarks in their own names, it can
hardly be argued that there is a more efficient way to refer to a player than
by using his name. 168 If a trademark-style nominative fair use provision
were incorporated into a federal right of publicity, it would allow fantasy
sports providers to easily reference the players by their names, as long as
there was no suggestion that the players endorsed the game. 169
¶48
A built-in fair use exception could prevent many of the problems
courts have had in trying to determine whether a fair use exception should
apply to a right of publicity action,170 and, if it does apply, how to best
balance it against an individual’s right of publicity in order to preserve a

163

See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)
(“[T]he issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright . . . .”).
164
15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006).
165
Id. § 1115(b)(4).
166
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).
167
Id. (citation omitted).
168
See id. at 306 (“For example, one might refer to ‘the two-time world
champions’ or ‘the professional basketball team from Chicago,’ but it’s far
simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls.”).
169
Obviously if a professional player wanted to endorse a particular game, he
and his agent would be free to negotiate the appropriate fee with the fantasy
sports provider.
170
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (“This case involves
a true advertisement run for the purpose of selling Samsung VCRs. . . .
Defendants’ [fair use] parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial
parodies.”).
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defendant’s First Amendment right to expression. 171 According to Judge
Kozinski,
[federal courts are] in a unique position . . . . State courts are unlikely
to be particularly sensitive to federal preemption, which, after all, is a
matter of first concern to the federal courts. The Supreme Court is
unlikely to consider the issue because the right of publicity seems so
much a matter of state law. . . . It’s our responsibility to keep the right
of publicity from taking away federally granted rights . . . from the
public . . . . 172
¶49
The Missouri district court and the Eighth Circuit found that
C.B.C.’s First Amendment rights outweighed the baseball players’ state
rights of publicity. If the Eighth Circuit affirms the Minnesota district
court’s ruling on venue, the CBS Interactive case will be another nail in the
coffin for the professional sports leagues and their efforts to maintain
control over their players’ rights of publicity. However, if the case is
ultimately decided in Florida, without the C.B.C. precedent, the issue could
easily be decided the other way. A federal right of publicity statute with a
built-in fair use exception would provide uniformity and better guidance to
courts in protecting parties’ constitutional rights.

CONCLUSION
¶50
The fantasy sports cases are a microcosm of the problems inherent
in allowing disparate state laws to govern actions that take place on a
national scale. The other major branches of intellectual property have
federal statutes to govern them: the Copyright Act of 1976,173 the
Trademark Act of 1946, 174 and the Patent Act.175 By placing the right of
publicity on equal footing with its intellectual property brethren and passing
a federal right of publicity statute, Congress would legitimize the fact that
federal courts are already deciding these issues and alleviate the several

171

See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In
deciding where the line should be drawn between Woods’s intellectual property
rights and the First Amendment, we find ourselves in agreement with the
dissenting judges in White. . . .”).
172
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court has only
considered one right of publicity case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Corp., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), and that case “is a red herring . . .
[because Zacchini] complained of the appropriation of the economic value of his
performance, not the economic value of his identity.” Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir. 1996).
173
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810, 1101 (2006).
174
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006).
175
35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000).
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problems illustrated by the fantasy sports cases: (1) the potential dormant
commerce clause violation, (2) the confusing application by federal courts
of state laws, and (3) the question of whether and how much the First
Amendment and a fair use exception should apply to the right of publicity.

